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Measured Boot Process

A measured boot process, as shown in the Figure 3-1, is a boot sequence starting at a root of trust for measurement (RTM) initiating a series of measurements consisting of all the relevant trusted compute base (TCB) components into the root of trust for storage (RTS). The measured boot performs no evaluation or verification of any of the component's identities.

Figure 3-1. Measured boot process

There are two ways defined by the trusted compute group (TCG) to establish this trust during boot:

• Static root of trust (S-RTM)

• Dynamic root of trust (D-RTM)

Figure 3-2 depicts these two boot models and the associated trust chains. As the name Static Root of Trust for Measurement (S-RTM) suggests, the entire trust begins with the static, immutable piece of code, which is called the core root of trust for measurement (CRTM). On ordinary computing platforms, BIOS is the first component to be executed.

Therefore, the trusted platform needs an additional entity to measure the BIOS and act as a CRTM. This entity is a fundamental trusted building block (TBB) that remains unchanged during the lifetime of the platform. The CRTM can be an integrated part of the BIOS itself (e.g., Microsoft Windows 8), like a BIOS boot block. The CRTM can also be a set of CPU instructions that are normally stored within a chip on the motherboard. This latter method can be more resistant to tampering, as exemplified by the Intel TXT.

Figure 3-2. S-RTM and D-RTM trusted chains

In the static root of trust method, all trust starts with a fixed or immutable piece of trusted code in the BIOS. This trusted piece of code measures the next piece of code to be executed and extends a platform configuration register (PCR) in the TPM based on the measurement before that control is transferred to the next program. If each new program in turn measures the next one before transferring control, there's a chain of trust established. If this measurement chain continues through the entire boot sequence, the resultant PCR values will reflect the measurement of all files used. This “measurement before execution” model therefore leads to a chain of trust that's observable by a remote party wanting to assess the trustworthiness of a system. Hence, S-RTM enables trust on the entire boot chain, including the master boot record, boot loader, kernel, drivers, and all files referenced or executed during boot. These are all parts of a trusted computing base (TCB). In other words, a TCB encompasses the sum of all the components that affect a system's assurance.

However, S-RTM has two shortcomings:

Scalability and Inclusivity. The number of components in a boot chain is large. Each component's trusted computing base (TCB), and hence security, depends on the many layers of code that have been executed earlier in the chain. Windows and Linux have an ill-defined TCB and therefore they require all executable content to be measured, including executables, libraries, and shell scripts. Components determining the chain of trust (including TCB) are subject to frequent patching and updating with their myriad configuration variations. Also, the launch order of elements in the chain may vary, leading to different measurement values in PCRs. Keeping track of the expected values for integrity measurements becomes a nettlesome task.

Uncontrolled Scope. The execution of an S-RTM sequence pulls in code for the evaluation of an OS TCB that's unrelated to the operation of the platform. This forces mostly unnecesary evaluations of software and firmware, including BIOS components loaded and run during the boot process, only to be discarded just to verify the integrity of the TCB.

These shortcomings were identified by the TCG. The newer TCG 1.2 specifications define a new mechanism for an authenticated boot: dynamic root of trust for measurement, or D-RTM.

Dynamic root of trust for measurement (D-RTM) reduces the complexity of the TCB, making the evaluation of the platform state more tractable. With D-RTM, the trust properties of the components are ignored until a secure event, such as an enabled hypervisor launch, triggers and initializes the system, starting the initial root of trust measurement. Components that were staged before the D-RTM secure event are excluded from the TCB and not allowed to execute after the trust properties of the system are established. D-RTM is much more streamlined compared to S-RTM.

The server platforms used in virtualization and cloud data centers present challenging boot scenarios where D-RTM alone won't suffice. The TCB in a true D-RTM implementation will not include the system management modules (SMM), which are needed to support server RAS (reliability, availability, scalability) features. SMM is part of the pre-boot BIOS, and a pure D-RTM implementation excludes these items. Intel TXT provides a hybrid implementation of S-RTM and D-RTM, as described above, to establish trust during the boot process. The book Intel Trusted Execution Technology for Server Platforms from Apress has exhaustive coverage of S-RTM and D-RTM.

 
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