Menu
Home
Log in / Register
 
Home arrow Economics arrow Generalized Microeconomics
Next >
Generalized Microeconomics - Jiri Hlavacek


Year 2014

Download


FOREWORD1. THE GENERALIZED PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC RATIONALITY1.1 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HOMO ECONOMICUS PARADIGM1.2 MINIMIZATION OF THE SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC EXTINCTION1.3 PARETO DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL1.3.1 FIRST-ORDER PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION1.3.2 SECOND-ORDER PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION1.3.3 GENERAL PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION2. MODELLING RISK AND HEDGING AGAINST IT2.1 PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL FOR INCOME AS A RANDOM VARIABLE2.2 FOR MULATION OF THE LENINGRAD CASINO PROBLEM2.3 MODEL OF THE ST. PETERSBURG PARADOX3. MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC SURVIVAL3.1 PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL3.1.1 ADVERSE SELECTION3.1.2 MORAL HAZARD3.2 APPLICATION OF GENERALIZED MICROECONOMICS: MAXIMIZATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC SURVIVAL3.2.1 THREAT TO THE AGENT DUE TO EXTINCTION OF THE PRINCIPAL3.2.2 ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL3.2.3 MORAL HAZARD IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL3.2.4 COMPARISON OF THE STANDARD HOMO ECONOMICUS WITH A SURVIVAL-PROBABILITY-MAXIMIZING AGENT4. THE DEMAND FUNCTION IN THE INSURANCE MARKET: COMPARISON OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE PARETO PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL WITH THE VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN EU THEORY AND KAHNEMAN-TVERSKY PROSPECT THEORY4.1 INSURANCE IN THE MODEL OF MAXIMIZATION OF AN AGENT'S PARETO PROBABILITY OF (ECONOMIC) SURVIVAL4.2 INSURANCE DEMAND IN THE VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN MODEL OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE EXPECTED UTILITY OF INCOME (EU THEORY)4.3 INSURANCE DEMAND IN THE KAHNEMAN-TVERSKY MODEL (PROSPECT THEORY, PT)4.4 COMPARISON OF THE DEMAND FUNCTIONS OF MODELS A, B, AND C (FROM THE PREVIOUS THREE SECTIONS)5. MODELLING NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS: THE UNIVERSITY SUPPLY FUNCTION5.1 ECONOMIC RATIONALITY IN THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR5.2 AN OPTIMIZATION MODEL OF UNIVERSITY BEHAVIOUR5.3 UNIVERSITY SUPPLY FUNCTION6. BEHAVIOUR OF A FIRM IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY- THE HOMO SE ASSECURANS MODEL6.1 SET OF FEASIBLE PRODUCTION SITUATIONS IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY6.2 THE INDEX PLANNING METHOD AND THE CRITERION OF A PRODUCER IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY6.3 MAXIMIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE RESERVE6.4 MAXIMIZATION OF THE RELATIVE RESERVE (I.E. MAXIMIZATION OF THE PARETO PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL IN A CPE)7. MODEL OF AN ECONOMY WITH WIDESPREAD CORPORATE INSOLVENCY7.1 THE PROBLEM OF SECONDARY INSOLVENCY7.2 MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING IN AN ECONOMY WITH WIDESPREAD SECONDARY INSOLVENCY7.2.1 MODEL A: MINIMAX STRATEGY7.2.2 MODEL B: MINIMUM EXTINCTION RISK STRATEGY8. THE PRODUCER'S OPTIMUM UNDER INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE8.1 MODEL A: UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PRICE8.2 MODEL B: UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PROFITABILITY8.3 MODEL C: NORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PROFITABILITY9. MODELS OF MARKET ALLOCATION OF EXTERNALITIES, GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM9.1 EMISSIONS PERMIT MARKET9.2 THE COASETHEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES9.2.1 THE COASE THEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF TWO PRODUCERS9.2.2 THE GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF SURVIVAL PROBABILITY MAXIMIZATION9.2.3 THE COASE THEOREM FOR THE CASE WHERE A PRODUCER HARMS A CONSUMER9.3 THE COASE THEOREM FOR POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES9.3.1 THE GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM FOR POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES AND AGENTS MAXIMIZING THEIR OWN SURVIVAL PROBABILITY9.3.2 SINGLE POSITIVE EXTERNALITY PROVIDER MODEL9.3.3 MULTIPLE POSITIVE EXTERNALITY PROVIDERS MODEL9.4 EFFICIENCY OF ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER OF INFORMATION BETWEEN AGENTS THAT DEPEND ON EACH OTHER TO SURVIVE9.4.1 MODEL A: INFORMATION EFFECT = INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER COST9.4.2 MODEL B: INFORMATION EFFECT < INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER COST10. ALTRUISM AND REDISTRIBUTION INCREASING THE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL OF INDIVIDUALS10.1 ALTRUISM AND BELONGING TO THE COMMUNITY10.2 REDISTRIBUTION10.2.1 THE SUPPLY SIDE OF REDISTRIBUTION (THE WILLINGNESS TO FOR GO PART OF ONE'S PERSONAL PROSPERITY) DERIVED FROM THE SOCIAL NATURE OF INDIVIDUALS' PREFERENCES10.2.2 THE WILLINGNESS TO REDISTRIBUTE IN FAVOUR OF PUBLIC GOODS (THE ACCEPTABILITY OF TAXATION)10.2.3 HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE TO REDISTRIBUTION10.2.4 THE "DEMAND SIDE" OF REDISTRIBUTION: THE INFORMATION PROBLEM10.2.5 EFFICIENCY OF REDISTRIBUTION IN RELATION TO THE DONOR'S PREFERENCES10.3 ALTRUISTIC ALLOCATION MODELS10.3.1 MODEL OF ABSOLUTE SOLIDARITY10.3.2 MODEL OF MINIMIZATION OF THE RISK OF SIMULTANEOUS EXTINCTION OF BOTH INDIVIDUALS: CRUEL ALTRUISM10.4 THE STATE IN THE ROLE OF DONOR10.5 SOME DEBATABLE PRINCIPLES/RULES OF THE DONOR ACTIVITIES OF THE STATE10.5.1 RESULT OF NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF A SUBSIDY TO THE NEXT PERIOD-OPTIMAL SUBSIDYTIMING MODEL10.5.2 PRESCRIBED SUBSIDY USE STRUCTURECONCLUSION
 
Found a mistake? Please highlight the word and press Shift + Enter  
Next >
 
Subjects
Accounting
Business & Finance
Communication
Computer Science
Economics
Education
Engineering
Environment
Geography
Health
History
Language & Literature
Law
Management
Marketing
Philosophy
Political science
Psychology
Religion
Sociology
Travel